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 Parliamentary Accountability 
and the Judicial System 
 Andrew  Le Sueur *  
 A.  Introduction 
 Tensions between political and legal accountability are a backdrop to many 
debates about the character and future direction of the British constitution. 1 Th is 
essay explores a juncture of these two modes of accountability by examining how 
the UK Parliament exercises accountability in relation to the judicial system of 
England and Wales. 
 Part A defi nes ‘the judicial system’ and what may be meant by parliamentary 
accountability and judicial independence in this context. Part B takes an institu-
tional and procedural approach to examining the opportunities Parliament has 
for engaging in accountability activities in relation to the judicial system, focusing 
in particular on the evolving role of Select Committees. Part C uses an inductive 
approach to map current accountability practices in Parliament in relation to par-
ticular aspects of the judicial system by drawing on examples from the parliamen-
tary record to develop an explanation of what is and ought to be the reach of MPs’ 
and peers’ accountability functions relating to judges and courts. 
 1.  Th e judicial system 
 Th e term ‘judicial system’ is used in this study to defi ne an area of state activity 
that is narrower than the whole legal system (so, for example, legal aid and the 
legal professions are left out) but broader than ‘the judiciary’ or ‘the judicial power 
of the state’. Deciding cases and, for the higher courts, judgment writing to cre-
ate precedents are the core activities of the judicial system. Closely connected to 
these are the practices and procedures of courts. Around this core is a penumbra 
 *  Professor of Constitutional Justice, University of Essex. I am grateful to Nicholas Bamforth, 
Graham Gee, and Peter Leyland for comments on a draft; and to Christopher Luff  for research assis-
tance; but of course any errors and omissions are mine alone. 
 1  An overview of the debates can be found in  A  Le Sueur ,  M  Sunkin and  J  Murkens  Public 
Law: Text, Cases, and Materials ( Oxford :  Oxford University Press,  2013 ),  ch 2. 
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of other activities and features that support and facilitate the judicial role. Th is 
includes the foundational texts (legislation and ‘soft law’) creating new courts and 
shaping the governance of the judiciary ; decision-making about judicial careers 
(appointments, terms and conditions of service, salaries and pensions, discipline 
and dismissals); deployment; training; and the management of the physical estate 
and infrastructures of the courts and tribunals. 
 Viewed as a set of institutions and decision-making processes, the judicial sys-
tem comprises judges, ministers (in particular the Lord Chancellor/Secretary of 
State for Justice), offi  cials, and holders of public offi  ce (such as the commissioners 
of the Judicial Appointments Commission for England and Wales)—all of them 
potential targets of accountability according to their responsibilities. 
 2.  Parliamentary accountability 
 Parliamentary accountability centres on formal questioning, comment, and critical 
evaluation of past decisions or changes to existing or proposed practices or policy 
by MPs and peers, as reported in  Hansard and other parliamentary publications. 
Th e occasional criticism of judges by ministers and other parliamentarians in inter-
views, conference speeches, 2 and extra-parliamentary writing 3 are important in set-
ting the tone of relations with the judiciary but they fall outside the scope of this 
essay, as they are not part of the formal parliamentary record. 
 Th e constitutional imperative for  some kind of accountability in relation to  some 
aspects of the judicial system cannot now be seriously doubted. 4 As a relevant 
principle, parliamentarians have accepted it, 5 as have the judiciary of England 
and Wales, 6 and ministers. 7 Th is refl ects the general importance now attached 
to clear lines of accountability across all public services; the legitimacy of most 
kinds of public power now depends on satisfactory accountability mechanisms. 
Th e challenge that remains is to defi ne more closely the circumstances in which 
 2  See eg. Home Secretary Th eresa May’s remarks at the 2011 Conservative Party conference 
disparaging a tribunal judge whom, she claimed, had ruled that an illegal immigrant could not be 
removed from the UK because of a pet cat: Adam Wagner, ‘Cat had nothing to do with failure to 
deport man’ ( UK Human Rights Blog , 4 October 2011) < http://ukhumanrightsblog.com/2011/10/04/
cat-had-nothing-to-do-with-failure-to-deport-man/ > accessed 10 March 2012. 
 3  For example, in 2012 steps were taken by the Northern Ireland Attorney General to prosecute 
Peter Hain MP (a former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) for the ancient form of contempt 
known as ‘scandalizing a judge’ over remarks he made about a judicial review judgment of Lord Justice 
Girvan in his memoirs  Outside In (London: Biteback 2012). Th e charges were dropped in May 2012 
after Hain wrote to the Attorney General to explain and clarify his remarks. 
 4  See  Andrew  Le Sueur ,  ‘Developing mechanisms for judicial accountability in the UK’  24  LS 
( 2004 )  73 . 
 5  See eg. House of Lords Constitution Committee,  Relations between the executive, the judiciary and 
Parliament (HL 2006-7, 151), para. 121; House of Lords Constitution Committee,  Relations between 
the executive, the judiciary and Parliament: Follow-up Report (HL 2007-8, 177). 
 6  ‘Th e Accountability of the Judiciary’ (2007) <http:// www.judiciary.gov.uk > (accessed 22 April 
2013). Th e essay focuses on England and Wales and addresses issues relating to the UK Supreme 
Court only in passing. 
 7  Department for Constitutional Aff airs,  Constitutional Reform: a new way of appointing judges (CP 
10/03, 2003). 
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parliamentarians may legitimately operate in relation to the judicial system, which 
accountability tools are best for the job, and what aspects of the judicial system 
should remain off -limits, or subject only to light-touch accountability oversight, 
by reason of the need to respect the constitutional principles of independence of 
the judiciary and separation of powers. Th is essay is a contribution to that debate. 
 a. Th e orthodox approach 
 Th e conventional account of the limits of parliamentary accountability for the 
judicial system rests on two main ideas. Th e fi rst is that the constitutional principle 
of judicial independence prohibits parliamentary scrutiny of the core aspect of the 
judicial system (deciding cases and setting precedents). In 2004 Chris Leslie MP, a 
junior minister, explained the point as follows  :
 Judicial decisions are taken and explained in public (save where the circumstances of a case 
demand confi dentiality) and any decision which a judge makes is liable to be scrutinised, 
and if necessary overturned, on appeal, which is also a public process. Judges are there-
fore fully accountable for their judicial decisions through the appeal system. Judges are 
not, however, accountable through a political process for the decisions they take, as this 
would not be consistent with judicial independence. Th e Lord Chancellor and Secretary 
of State therefore does not monitor appeals against decisions made by individual judges, 
and it is not his role to intervene in judicial decisions or consider complaints about judicial 
decisions. 8 
 Th e constitutional principle of judicial independence is a multifaceted concept. 9 
It relates to individual judges (who should not be placed under such personal 
pressure through inquiries or criticism by politicians as to infl uence or risk infl u-
encing their decision making) and to the judiciary as a whole (which as an insti-
tution of the state should enjoy a relatively high degree of autonomy vis-à-vis 
government and parliament). Orthodox thinking priorities judicial independence 
over accountability:  the latter must yield to the former in day-to-day practices 
and in constitutional design. It will be argued later that the broad  cordon sani-
taire around the judicial system that is often called for in the name of orthodox 
approaches to judicial independence is out of step with actual developments in the 
UK Parliament. Parliamentarians believe they can, and they do, question aspects of 
the judicial system more than orthodox thinking suggests is proper. 
 Th e other main idea in the orthodox approach is the assumption that account-
ability practices associated with ministerial responsibility are adequate to scruti-
nize other aspects of the judicial system beyond the prohibited zone. In other 
words, ministers are and should be answerable through parliamentary questions, 
in debates, in Select Committee inquiries ; and this delivers a satisfactory level of 
accountability. Before 2005, the Lord Chancellor was the member of government 
 8  HC Deb 22 January 2004, vol 416, col 1448W (answering a question from Vera Baird QC MP). 
 9  For a detailed statement of the particular norms contained under its umbrella, see  Th e Mount 
Scopus Approved Revised International Standards of Judicial Independence (March 2008) < http://www.
jwp.org > (accessed 30 July 2013). 
09_Ch09_9780199670024C09.indd   202 10/25/2013   3:29:41 PM
Andrew Le Sueur 203
responsible for judicial appointments, for allocation of resources to the courts, 
and so on—and he was answerable to Parliament for these matters. Whether in 
practice, ministerial responsibility was an eff ective form of accountability is open 
to question, not least because the Lord Chancellor’s Department was the last of 
the major government departments to become shadowed by a House of Commons 
Select Committee. 10 
 b. Recent innovations 
 Th is approach to accountability of the judicial system (that is, a prohibited zone 
plus ministerial accountability for the penumbra) is no longer satisfactory. First, 
remarkable changes to the scope of the ‘judicial power of the state’ 11 have taken 
place, through the development of common law powers of judicial review, the 
impact of the Human Rights Act 1998, and of European Union law. Judicial 
decision-making now impacts on government policy-making and parliamen-
tary legislation in ways unthinkable two generations ago. It is unrealistic, against 
the background of these developments, to imagine that Parliament and parlia-
mentarians will or should want to maintain a  cordon sanitaire around judicial 
decision-making. Insofar as court decisions impact on the national interest and 
the lives of constituents, parliamentarians will want to debate and criticise them. 
 Second, since 2005 there have been equally remarkable changes to the gov-
ernance arrangements for the judicial system. Th e radical reforms to the offi  ce 
of Lord Chancellor mean that traditional notions of ministerial responsibility 
are no longer adequate to secure accountability for leadership roles, budgets, 
and decision-making powers that have been transferred or shared beyond the 
government department responsible for the judicial system—which was the 
Lord Chancellor’s Department (‘LCD’) up to 2003, the relatively short-lived 
Department for Constitutional Aff airs 2003-7 (nicknamed ‘DeCaf ’ by some 
wags but more respectfully ‘the DCA’) and the Ministry of Justice (‘MoJ’) since 
May 2007. 
 Th e Lord Chancellor/Secretary of State provides political leadership in the 
Ministry of Justice, with four junior ministers. Th e Lord Chancellor and Secretary 
of State are two distinct ministerial offi  ces to which the Prime Minister appoints 
the same person. Legislation dealing with judiciary-related matters normally speci-
fi es the Lord Chancellor to be the responsible minister, though on occasion there 
has been debate as to which is the appropriate minister. 12 Th e distinction is of 
constitutional importance as the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 places broad 
duties on the Lord Chancellor to ‘have regard’ to ‘the need to defend’ the inde-
pendence of the judiciary and ‘the need for the public interest in regard to matters 
relating to the judiciary or otherwise to the administration of justice to be properly 
 10  See generally Dawn Oliver and Gavin Drewry Th e Law and Parliament ( London :  Butterworths  1998 ) . 
 11  Th e turn of phrase used in the Contempt of Court Act 1981, s 19. 
 12  Th e bill that became the Legal Services Act 2007 initially had the Secretary of State as the respon-
sible minister; it was amended to Lord Chancellor: see HL Deb, 9 January 2007, vol 688, col 136. 
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represented in decisions aff ecting those matters’. 13 Other ministers have the lesser 
duty to ‘uphold the continued independence of the judiciary’. 14 Th e Ministry is 
a major department of state (no longer the sleepy backwater that the LCD once 
was), with an annual budget of £8.58 billion in 2011-12, of which £1.21 billion 
is allocated to HM Courts and Tribunals Service. Th e Ministry employed over 
78,000 FTE staff  in 2009-10. 
 In the new governance arrangements, several important functions are now car-
ried out by public bodies that have an arm’s length relationship to the Ministry, 
some with executive powers, some dispute resolution and inspection roles, and 
some advisory. Th is judicial comitology is set out in Appendix 1 below. Several 
have been or shortly will be abolished under the Public Bodies Act 2011 as part of 
government policy to reduce the number and cost of quangos. 
 Other roles have been transferred directly to the judiciary, under the ultimate 
leadership of the LCJ; a network of boards and committees carry out executive 
decisions and advisory work (see Appendix 2). Th e Judicial Offi  ce consists of 
approximately 190 FTE civil servants who report directly to the Lord Chief Justice 
rather than to ministers. 15 It has fi ve groups of staff : strategy, communications, and 
governance; human resources; senior judicial support through private offi  ces and 
jurisdictional teams; the Judicial College; and corporate services. Th ere are plans 
to transfer decision-making power to accept, reject, or ask for reconsideration of 
selections by the Judicial Appointments Commission for some judicial posts from 
the Lord Chancellor (in the Ministry of Justice) to the Lord Chief Justice (in 
eff ect, to the Judicial Offi  ce); presumably a transfer of staff  from the Ministry of 
Justice will accompany this. 16 Th e Judicial Executive Board (JEB), ‘which appears 
to be envisaged as a sort of judicial Cabinet’, 17 is chaired by the Lord Chief Justice 
and comprises nine senior judges with management responsibilities and the chief 
executive of the Judicial Offi  ce. 
 A more varied range of accountability mechanisms is needed to respond to 
these redistributions and fragmentations of responsibility. Th is essay focuses on 
what happens (or does not happen) in Parliament, but it is instructive to note 
developments in accountability elsewhere. One is that as head of the judiciary of 
England and Wales, the LCJ holds an annual press conference, the transcript of 
which is published online. In December 2011, Joshua Rozenberg, Frances Gibb 
( Th e Times ) and other journalists from the  Daily Telegraph , the  Guardian, Daily 
Mail, Evening Standard, BBC, ITV News, and the Press Association questioned 
Lord Judge for 45 minutes. 18 Th e LCJ expressed diffi  dence in answering several 
 13  CRA 2005, s 3(6).    14  CRA 2005, s 3(1). 
 15  < http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/training-support/jo-index > (accessed 22 April 2013). 
 16  Ministry of Justice,  Appointments and Diversity: ‘A Judiciary for the 21st Century’ ( London: Ministry 
of Justice  2011 ) ; Crime and Courts Act 2013. 
 17  HLConstitution Committee,  Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament (6th 
report of 2006-7) para. 100. 
 18  ‘Press conference held by the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales’ (London, 6 December 
2011) < http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/News%20Release/lcj-press- 
conference-06122011.pdf > (accessed 22 April 2013). 
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questions on matters of current political controversy (legal aid reform, mandatory 
life sentences for murder) or because they dealt with particular cases (contempt 
of court). Other questions related to parliamentary privilege, sentencing after the 
summer 2011 riots, and the prison population. Asked about a controversial pub-
lic lecture given by Jonathan Sumption QC shortly before his swearing in as a 
Justice of the Supreme Court, 19 Lord Judge said he was ‘very sympathetic with Mr 
Sumption and the views he has expressed’, telling Steve Doughty of the  Daily Mail 
that ‘I would love to give you something to write down’. Lord Judge said ‘Judges 
have to be careful to remember that we are enforcing the law. As to that, we have 
no choice. We enforce the law as we fi nd it to be. I think we have to be careful to 
remember that we cannot administer the responsibilities which others have’. 
 Since the 2010 coalition government came to power, new political priorities for 
accountability across the whole of government have been articulated. In a speech 
to civil servants, David Cameron MP outlined the Conservatives’ approach:
 We want to replace the old system of bureaucratic accountability with a new system of 
democratic accountability—accountability to the people, not the government machine. 
We want to turn government on its head, taking power away from Whitehall and putting 
it into the hands of people and communities. We want to give people the power to improve 
our country and public services, through transparency, local democratic control, competi-
tion and choice. 20 
 Courts boards provide an illustration of the new approach in relation to the judi-
cial system. Th e Courts Act 2003, s 4 provided that ‘England and Wales is to be 
divided into areas for each of which there is to be a courts board’. Boards had the 
duty ‘to scrutinise, review and make recommendations about the way in which 
the Lord Chancellor is discharging his general duty in relation to the courts with 
which the board is concerned’. 21 Boards consisted of at least one judge, two lay 
magistrates, and at least four others , two of whom were ‘representative of the 
people living in the area’. 22 Over time, their number was reduced from 42 to 
19. Th ey are abolished under the Public Bodies Act 2011; during the passage 
of that bill, the minister explained ‘there are now other structures in place such 
as the Justice Issues Group and area judicial forums to ensure that magistrates’ 
views are heard. Th ere are also strong local relationships with magistrates’ bench 
chairs’ and ‘there are other ways to ensure that the needs of the community are 
met, such as customer surveys, open days and more eff ective use of court user 
meetings’. 23 
 19  Jonathan Sumption, ‘Judicial and political decision-making:  the uncertain boundary’ (Th e FA 
Mann Lecture, London, 9 November 2011)  < http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/interactive/2011/
nov/09/jonathan-sumption-speech-politicisation-judges > (accessed 22 April 2013). For a response, 
see Stephen Sedley, ‘Judicial Politics’  London Review of Books Vol. 34 , No.4, (2012) 15. 
 20  David Cameron, ‘We will make government accountable to the people’ (8 July 2010) < http://
www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2010/07/David_Cameron_We_will_make_government_
accountable_to_the_people.aspx > (accessed 22 April 2013). 
 21  Courts Act 2003, s 5.    22  Courts Act 2003, sch 1, para. 2. 
 23  Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally), HL Deb 11 January 2011, vol 747, col 
1305-6. 
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 Transparency has swept through the judicial system in recent years. Th e Ministry 
of Justice’s business plan makes a commitment ‘to ensure that the Department can 
be held to account as it moves this work forward and we will do this through 
our information strategy. Along with the rest of government, the Department will 
publish an unprecedented amount of data so the public can hold us to account. 
Th is will cover who we are, what we spend and what we achieve’. 24 Th e Ministry 
now publishes, by court: what sentences are given for each type of off ence; convic-
tion rates; how long it takes for cases to be decided; the number of sitting days; 
and fi nancial allocation and spend. 25 A similar commitment to transparency can 
be seen in the arm’s length bodies, down to trivial expense claims. 26 More sig-
nifi cantly, the whole judicial selection process is described in great detail on the 
Judicial Appointment Commission’s website and in its publications. 
 B. Opportunities for parliamentary accountability 
 Against this background of dramatic increases in the judicial power of the state, 
changes in governance and new approaches to accountability, what role does 
Parliament have in oversight of the judicial system? What role should it have? 
Finding answers to these questions is not straightforward, not least because of the 
need to protect judicial independence from inappropriately targeted accountabil-
ity claims. 
 1.  Th e accountability toolkit 
 Parliament has at its disposal a variety of accountability mechanisms that can be 
deployed for oversight of the judicial system. Examples of how these are used are 
provided below : 
 i.  Th ere are opportunities to scrutinize legislative proposals. In relation to 
bills, this now includes the possibility of pre-legislative scrutiny (if the 
government publishes a bill in draft), the legislative process in each House 
(with the parallel scrutiny of committees including the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights and the House of Lords Constitution Committee), and 
relatively new practices of post-legislative scrutiny (where the responsible 
government department reviews legislation fi ve years or so after enact-
ment and reports to a Select Committee). 
 24  Ministry of Justice,  Business Plan 2011-15 (London, 2011)  < http://www.number10.gov.uk/
wp-content/uploads/MOJ-Business-Plan1.pdf > (accessed 22 April 2013). 
 25  See < http://www.justice.gov.uk/statistics/previous-stats/criminal-annual > (accessed 22 April 2013). 
 26  Anybody interested can, for example, fi nd on the JAC’s website detailed information on expenses 
such as that Dame Lorna Kelly claimed £4.25 for meals on 28 July 2011 in relation to a selection 
and character committee and diversity forum: JAC, ‘Senior Management Team and Commissioner 
Expenses Q2’ < http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/about-jac/1112.htm > (accessed 8 March 2012). 
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 ii.  A variety of diff erent kinds of debate may be held on the fl oor of the House, 
including government motions, topical debates, substantive motions for the 
adjournment, and daily adjournment debates. 
 iii.  Ministers are obliged to answer oral and written questions. ‘Th e purpose of a 
question is to obtain information or press for action; it should not be framed 
primarily so as to convey information, or so as to suggest its own answer or 
to convey a particular point of view, and it should not be in eff ect a short 
speech’. 27 
 iv.  Early Day Motions proposed by backbench MPs drawing attention to an 
event or cause, which MPs sign to register their support. Hardly any are actu-
ally debated. 28 
 v.  Select Committee inquires enable MPs and peers (usually working in a 
non-partisan, cross-party manner) to carry out detailed evidence-based 
investigations, receiving oral and written evidence. Reports may be debated 
on the fl oor of the House or in Westminster Hall. Th e relevant government 
department is expected to make a formal response to the committee’s fi nd-
ings and recommendations. 
 vi.  Pre-appointment Select Committee hearings for appointments to various 
senior public offi  ces. 29 In relation to the judicial system, the House of 
Commons Justice Committee is responsible for scrutinizing the government’s 
preferred candidate for the chair of the Judicial Appointments Commission 
and the Chair of the Offi  ce of Legal Complaints. Some commentators have 
argued in favour of extending pre-appointment scrutiny to senior judicial 
posts but so far Parliament has viewed this as anathema. 30 
 Th ese may form a network of interconnected activities: for example, what a judge 
says in oral evidence to a Select Committee may be quoted in the committee’s 
report, which in turn will prompt a debate in the House and a response from min-
isters; another illustration of the connectedness of the mechanisms is that informa-
tion obtained by an MP from a written parliamentary question may be used to 
lobby a minister or in a speech on the fl oor of the House. 
 2.  Select Committees 
 Select committees have acquired a central role in accountability practices relat-
ing to the judicial system. Th ey provide the most rigorous sort of parliamentary 
scrutiny, conducting thematic inquiries based on oral and written evidence. 
 27  M  Jack (ed),  Erskine May’s Treaties on Th e Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament 
(24th edn,  London :  LexisNexis,  2011 ),  357 . 
 28  See < http://www.parliament.uk/edm > (accessed 22 April 2013). 
 29  House of Commons Liaison Committee,  Pre-appointment hearings by Select Committees 
(2007-8, 384); Paul Waller and Mark Chalmers,  An evaluation of pre-appointment scrutiny hearings 
(London: UCL Constitution Unit 2010). 
 30  See section C3 below. 
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On occasion, the launch of an inquiry makes front-page news. 31 Sometimes a 
Select Committee oral evidence session ends with the publication of a transcript on 
the relevant committee’s web page. Normally, however, the Select Committee pro-
duces a report containing fi ndings and recommendations, often accompanied by a 
press release. Th e government is expected to make a formal written response within 
two months, which in turn is published by the Select Committee (with or with-
out further comment). Subject to the pressures on the parliamentary time-table, 
a Select Committee will attempt to secure a debate on the fl oor of the House for 
a signifi cant inquiry. Th us, on 18 November 2008 the Constitution Committee’s 
two reports on relations between the executive, judiciary and Parliament were the 
subject of a ‘take note’ debate in the ‘dinner hour’ during which ten speeches were 
made. 32 Th ey are able to engage in follow-up inquiries if it is thought desirable to 
return to an issue. Th e practice of the Constitution Committee and the Justice 
Committee of having periodic meetings with the LCJ and the Lord Chancellor 
also enables some ‘triangulation’ to take place, whereby one is able to comment on 
the evidence previously given by the other. 
 One of the most notable developments in recent years is the phenomenon of 
judges appearing to give oral evidence to Select Committees and submitting written 
evidence. 33 Appendix 3 summarises the inquiries at which judges have appeared to 
give oral evidence on 38 separate occasions between 2006 and August 2012. Eight 
diff erent Select Committees received evidence, though appearances were concen-
trated in the House of Commons Justice Committee and the House of Lords 
Constitution Committee. During the passage of the Constitutional Reform Bill 
there was discussion about the pros and cons of establishing a Select Committee on 
the judiciary. Th is might be a joint committee of both Houses and have a statutory 
basis. 34 So far, this has not been thought necessary or desirable. 35 
 Th e 35 individual judges contributing to the work of Select Committees come 
from all levels of the court hierarchy, from the magistrates’ courts to the Supreme 
Court. Unsurprisingly, it is those judges with leadership responsibilities who 
appear most frequently (in particular the LCJ and Heads of Division); there is now 
an expectation, fi rming up into a constitutional convention, that the LCJ will meet 
the House of Commons Justice Committee and the House of Lords Constitution 
Committee on an annual basis. Clearly , Select Committees are also keen to hear 
from judges with experience of the coalface in the lower courts and tribunals. 
From time to time, judges have expressed or implied concerns about the amount 
of time it takes to prepare and appear before committees—time away from other 
 31  eg.  Th e Times led with the launch of the House of Lords Constitution Committee’s 2011 inquiry 
into the judicial appointments process: Frances Gibb and David Brown, ‘Too male, white and elitist? 
Too right, admit top lawyers’  Th e Times (London, 6 July 2011) 12-13. 
 32  HL Deb 18 November 2009, vol 705, col 1102. 
 33  Judges may also appear before House of Commons public bill committees: Dame Janet Smith 
(Smith LJ) gave oral evidence to the Health and Social Care public bill committee drawing on her 
experiences as the chair of the Shipman inquiry (2007-8, 8 January 2008). 
 34  Select Committee on the Constitutional Reform Bill,  Report (2003-4,125-I), para. 420. 
 35  HL Constitution Committee,  Relations (2006-7, 151) para. 129. 
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administrative responsibilities or sitting in court. In  Th e Lord Chief Justice’s Report 
2010–12 , Lord Judge notes that ‘Since the General Election, there has been an 
increase in the number of judges invited to assist Parliament with their enquiries’ 
and continued:
 Judges are able to provide valuable technical advice to Parliament, which is particularly 
useful in an era of increasingly complex legislation. However, for appearances to be mutu-
ally benefi cial both the judiciary and Parliament need to be mindful of their respective 
roles—as Parliamentarians are aware, there are some areas of enquiry in which it is not 
appropriate for judges to become involved, for example in relation to political matters or 
issues relating to a particular case. Being drawn into such matters would be damaging for 
both future involvement in the work of committees and for the impartiality and reputation 
of the judiciary. For this reason, care is exercised by those involved when responding and in 
considering invitations to judges to appear before Parliament. 36 
 Th ere appears, however, to be a feeling on the part of the judiciary and parliamen-
tarians that meetings with Select Committees are generally valuable experiences 
for both sides. 
 Over time, the judiciary has taken a more coordinated approach to requests to 
appear before committees. Th e Judicial Offi  ce explains:
 Should a Select Committee feel they require a judge to appear before them, the normal 
process is for the relevant Committee to contact the Lord Chief Justice’s Offi  ce seeking for 
an appropriate judge to be identifi ed, or to approach the judge directly. On some occasions 
judges are unable to attend Committee hearings due to sitting and other prior commit-
ments. On other occasions it may be suggested to the Committee that judicial attendance 
would not be appropriate, as the issues to be discussed are ‘political’ in nature or might 
require adjudication at a later date. Th is has never caused diffi  culties in the past; either the 
Committee accepts an alternative judge, or it would be inappropriate for a judge to give 
evidence. Neither the Lord Chief Justice, nor the Judicial Offi  ce acting on his behalf, has 
ever prohibited attendance of a judge before a Select Committee. 37 
 In July 2008, the Judicial Executive Board issued ‘Guidance for Judges appearing 
before or providing written evidence to parliamentary committees’. 38 Th e docu-
ment provides a list of types of questions which judges may not be willing to 
answer or in respect of which they will need to exercise caution:  ‘the merits of 
individual cases ’; ‘cases over which they have presided ’; ‘the merits or personalities 
of particular serving judges and politicians ’; ‘the merits of Government policy’; and 
bills or proposed legislation, ‘save where the policy in question aff ects the admin-
istration of justice within his or her area of judicial responsibility ’; the adminis-
tration of justice which falls outside the judge’s area of responsibility or previous 
responsibility ; and matters on which the government is consulting to which the 
judiciary will but has not yet responded. In fact, it is rare for a judge to be asked a 
 36  Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales,  Th e Lord Chief Justice’s Report 2010-12 (Judicial Offi  ce 
2012) paras 23-4. 
 37  Letter to the author, 13 December 2011. 
 38  < http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Guidance/select_committee_  guid-
ance0708.pdf > (accessed 22 April 2013). 
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question during a Select Committee hearing that the judge feels it inappropriate to 
answer. Th e committee clerk drafts lines of questioning, often with the assistance 
of a part-time specialist adviser. 39 Th e practice in the House of Lords is for wit-
nesses to be sent the proposed lines of questioning several days in advance of the 
hearing, though this does not happen routinely in the Commons. Th e extent to 
which members of a committee depart from the suggested lines of question varies, 
but for the most part the interview proceeds along the pre-prepared lines. 
 Judicial appearances before Select Committees have diff erent kinds of func-
tion. In some inquiries the judiciary is the focus of scrutiny. As the Constitution 
Committee states, Select Committees ‘can play an important role in holding the 
judiciary to account by questioning the judges in public’. 40 Into this type fall the 
annual appearances of the LCJ. Where necessary, committees may be critical of 
the judiciary:  thus, in 2007 the Constitution Committee gently suggested that 
the LCJ needed to re-appraise his media and public communications strategy and 
that the judges needed to make the Judicial Communications Offi  ce ‘more active 
and assertive in its dealing with the media in order to represent the judiciary eff ec-
tively’. 41 Later in the essay, two further examples of inquiries which included a 
focus on the judiciary are considered in which judges  did not give evidence: the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights’ inquiry into how the judiciary were interpret-
ing s 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (wrongly, the committee found); 42 and an 
inquiry by the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee which 
considered the judgments of Mr Justice Eady in relation to privacy (fi nding that 
the judge had not, contrary to the assertions of a newspaper editor, departed from 
precedent in cases on privacy rights). 43 One possible reason for not hearing from 
judges in these inquiries is that any lines of questioning would have quickly taken 
the committees into forbidden territory—the merits of cases and the merits of 
particular serving judges. 
 A further function of judicial evidence is to comment on or criticize govern-
ment policy or action in relation to the administration of justice or areas of public 
policy in which judges have particular experience or expertise. Th us, Sir Nicholas 
Wall (President of the Family Division of the High Court) was quoted in a com-
mittee’s report on the government’s proposed reform of legal aid as saying that 
the government ‘is very ill-advised to concentrate on violence’ rather than use the 
term ‘domestic abuse’; and he said that the proposals created ‘a perverse incentive’ 
to take out injunctive proceedings against a former spouse. 44 His predecessor, Sir 
Mark Potter, described earlier proposals as ‘a series of extremely crudely averaged 
 39  To declare an interest:  the author has served as specialist adviser to the House of Commons 
Constitutional Aff airs Committee, the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitutional 
Reform Bill, the House of Lords Constitution Committee, and the House of Commons Justice 
Committee in relation to judiciary-related matters. 
 40  HL Constitution Committee,  Relations (2006-7, 151) para. 124. 
 41  HL Constitution Committee,  Relations (2006-7, 151) paras 160, 171. 
 42  See Example 1.1. below.    43  See Example 1.4 below. 
 44  House of Commons Justice Committee,  Government’s proposed reform of legal aid (HC 2010-11, 
681) paras 83-4. 
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fi xed fees’, concluding that ‘the whole thing has to be radically revised’. 45 In rela-
tion to inquiries of this sort, Select Committee evidence is one way in which judges 
may make known to Parliament their misgivings about government proposals. 
 A third function of judicial evidence is educative: to explain to parliamentar-
ians what the judges’ role involves and what the limits of that role are. Examples 
include Baroness Hale’s evidence to the JCHR on a British bill of rights (about 
adjudication on social and economic rights) 46 and Ryder J’s evidence to the Justice 
Committee on the operation of family courts (on the diff erence that hearing the 
voice of the child could make). 47 Th e Constitution Committee has suggested that 
there might be more of this kind of interaction, with judges ‘encouraged to discuss 
their views on key legal issues in the cause of transparency and better understand-
ing of such issues amongst both parliamentarians and the public’. 48 As the com-
mittee noted, judges discuss issues such as the interpretation of the Human Rights 
Act 1998 49 or the use of  Pepper v Hart 50 in public lectures and in academic writing. 
 Measuring the concrete infl uence of the work of Select Committees  is far from 
straightforward. 51 Th is is as true of inquiries in relation to the judicial system as it is 
in other contexts. It may be that the importance lies in the activity of engagement 
by parliamentarians with judges and others about the judicial system (rather than 
any specifi c ‘wins’ in infl uencing policy or practice). Select committee hearings 
now provide the only offi  cial forum in which parliamentarians and judges may 
have a public conversation. Before the CRA 2005, the senior judiciary who were 
peers (the Law Lords and the Lord Chief Justice) were able to make contributions 
to debates on the fl oor of the House and, the conscientious objectors apart, 52 did so 
until disqualifi ed in the new constitutional arrangements. 53 A sense of proportion 
is, however , needed: concern for judiciary-related matters is something of a niche 
interest among parliamentarians. Except perhaps where  an MP’s constituency is 
aff ected by court closures or reorganisation, the judicial system barely registers on 
 45  HC Justice Committee,  Implementation of the Carter review on legal aid (HC 2006–7, 
223) para. 107. 
 46  Joint Committee on Human Rights,  A bill of rights for the UK? (2007-8, 165) paras 170, 189–90. 
 47  HC Justice Committee,  Operation of the family courts (2010–12, 518) para. 146. 
 48  HL Constitution Committee,  Relations (2006–7, 151) para. 126 (but noting that ‘under no cir-
cumstances must committees ask judges to comment on the pros and cons of individual judgments’. 
 49  Examples of lectures by serving judges on the HRA include: Lord Justice Elias, ‘Th e rise of the 
Strasbourgeoisie: judicial activism and the ECHR’ (Annual Lord Renton Lecture, Statute Law Society, 
24 November 2009); Lord Bingham, ‘Th e way we live now: human rights in the new millennium’ 
(Earl Grey Memorial Lecture, University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 29 January 1998), and Baroness 
Hale, ‘Salford Human Rights Conference’ (4 June 2010) < http://www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/
speech_100604.pdf > (accessed 22 April 2013). 
 50  Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593 (holding that ministerial statements reported in 
 Hansard made during the passage of a bill could be used as an aid to interpreting ambiguous statutory 
provisions); the judgment was criticized by eg. Lord Steyn ‘ Pepper v Hart : a re-examination’ (2001) 
21 OJLS 59. 
 51  See  Meg  Russell and  Meghan  Benton ,  Selective Infl uence: the policy impacts of House of Commons 
Select Committees ( UCL Constitution Unit   2011 ) . 
 52  Some, such as Lord Bingham in his role as Senior Law Lord, Lord Steyn and Baroness Hale took 
no part in legislative proceedings in the House of Lords while serving Law Lords. 
 53  CRA 2005, s 137. 
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the political agenda of most parliamentarians. Some Select Committee hearings 
with judges have been poorly attended by MPs. 
 C. Mapping accountability practices in Parliament 
 Th e previous section focused on the institutional mechanisms through which 
Parliament exercises accountability functions in relation to the judicial system. 
To develop a more nuanced and contextual understanding, attention now shifts 
to particular aspects of the judicial system. Five areas have been selected: (i) court 
judgments on points of law; (ii) the legislative and other texts that form the foun-
dations of the judicial system; (iii) judicial appointments; (iv) judicial discipline; 
and (v) judicial leadership. An inductive approach is adopted to map out current 
accountability practices based on observation of the parliamentary record and to 
sketch out some basic principles that emerge from the realities of work in the 
Palace of Westminster. In several diff erent ways there is tension between what hap-
pens, what the ‘rule book’ indicates ought to happen (or not happen), and under-
standings of how basic constitutional principles such as the independence of the 
judiciary ought to operate. 
 1.  Scrutiny of court judgments on points of law 
 Th e parliamentary rulebook discourages parliamentary scrutiny of the core judicial 
function of deciding cases and setting precedents.  Erskine May states that ques-
tions to ministers ‘seeking an expression of opinion on a question of law, such as 
the interpretation of a statute, or of an international document, a Minister’s own 
powers, etc, are not in order since the courts rather than Ministers are competent 
in such matters’. 54  Sub judice rules adopted by each House seek generally to pre-
vent references being made to active court proceedings in any motion, debate or 
question (subject to the discretion of the Speaker or committee chair). 55 Moreover, 
questions ‘which refl ect on the decision of a court of law’ are not in order. 56 As already 
noted, the Judicial Executive Board guidance to members of the judiciary appearing 
before Select Committees urges judges to avoid answering questions which deal 
with the ‘merits of individual cases’. In between these obstacles, there is, however , 
scope for parliamentary scrutiny of judgments. 57 Parliamentarians, from time to 
time, have reason to consider rulings of the courts and have the ultimate power 
to change the law if a majority of both Houses agree, in legislation, that the law 
as enunciated by the courts is not in the public interest. Consider the following 
examples. 
 Example 1.1. Th e Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) issued two reports 
critical of the way in which courts had interpreted the meaning of ‘public function’ 
 54  M  Jack (ed.),  Erskine May’s Treaties on Th e Law, Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament 
(24th edn,  LexisNexis,  2011 ) . 
 55  Erskine May , pp 364, 441-2.    56  Erskine May , p 365.    57  See section B2 above. 
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in s 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Th e fi rst report criticized the case law as ‘in 
human rights terms, highly problematic’, fi nding that the ‘development of the case 
law has signifi cant and immediate practical implications’. It called for the govern-
ment to intervene in a future case to argue for a change in the courts’ approach to 
interpretation. 58 Th e second report was made while an appeal on the relevant point 
of law was pending before the House of Lords, preventing the committee from 
commenting on the particular case. 59 Both reports drew on written evidence from 
a variety of public bodies and interest groups. Th e reports led to an unsuccessful 
private member’s bill seeking to reverse the precedent set by a series of judgments, 
including House of Lords authority; a change of law was brought about by s 145 
of the Health and Social Care Act 2008, resulting in care homes being subject to 
the Convention rights. 
 Th e methodical work of the JCHR in reviewing case law and bringing together 
a body of evidence about the impact of the approach taken by the courts to inter-
preting the HRA 1998 should not be regarded as undermining judicial independ-
ence, so long as parliamentarians are clear that their views expressed in reports 
and debates are opinions expressed in a political arena. In the UK, it is safe to 
assume that the courts will exclude politicians’ views as generally irrelevant to 
their adjudicatory task. Th is can be seen in the leading case of  YL v Birmingham 
City Council in which the Law Lords had to consider the same issue canvassed 
by the JCHR. Lord Mance, noting the existence of the two reports, said ‘such 
statements must be left to one side’ and ‘So far as these reports proceed on the 
basis that Parliament had any particular intention, that is the issue which the 
[Appellate Committee of the] House has to determine according to the relevant 
principles of statutory construction’. 60 Reference was also made to the written evi-
dence to the JCHR from Age Concern England. 61 A majority of their Lordships 
gave an interpretation of the HRA at odds with the desired approach advocated 
by the JCHR. 
 Example 1.2. Th e Compensation Act 2006, s 1 sought to ensure that ‘desirable 
activities’ were not discouraged because of fear of liability under the common law 
of negligence or breach of statutory duty if it resulted in harm by clarifying the 
approach of courts to assessing what constitutes reasonable care in individual cases. 
During its passage as a bill, a Select Committee took evidence and reported on 
the ‘compensation culture’. 62 In carrying out post-legislative scrutiny 63 of the Act 
in 2012, the Ministry of Justice told the Justice Select Committee it had not car-
ried out any detailed examination to assess the impact of s 1. To do so would, the 
Ministry said, be ‘impractical in resource terms’ but also would not be appropriate 
 58  Joint Committee on Human Rights,  Th e Meaning of Public Authority under the Human Rights Act 
(HL 2003-4, 39; HC 2003-4, 382). 
 59  Human Rights,  Public Authority (HL 2006-7, 77; HC 2006-7, 410). 
 60  [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 AC 95, [90].    61  [2007] UKHL 27, [2008] 1 AC 95, [117]. 
 62  HC Constitutional Aff airs Committee,  Compensation Culture (HC 2005-6, 754-I). 
 63  See Offi  ce of the Leader of the House of Commons,  Post-legislative Scrutiny: Th e Government’s 
Approach (Cm 7320, 2008). 
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‘as it could be seen as undermining the independence of the judiciary and casting 
doubt on the way in which they have interpreted the law’. 64 
 Clearly there is a diff erence between the Ministry’s and the JCHR’s understand-
ing of the constitutional propriety of a body other than the courts discussing the case 
law fl owing from relatively recent legislation. Th e judiciary did not seem to share the 
Ministry’s concerns when the idea of post-legislative scrutiny was fi rst being worked 
out in recommendations of the House of Lords Constitution Committee and the 
Law Commission. 65 Th e Law Commission heard from the Association of District 
Judges that the ‘most important considerations for review were likely to be “diffi  cul-
ties in interpretation and unintended legal consequences” ’. 66 Th e Judges’ Council 
envisaged that ‘individual judges might send any comments they have made about 
legislation in judgments to the body undertaking the scrutiny work and that judges 
should be made aware of this possibility but not obliged to follow this route’. 67 So 
long as Parliament does not trespass into retrospective interference with individual 
cases (which must remain exclusively for the courts), the sort of corrective instigated 
by the JCHR in relation to s 6 of the HRA ought to be viewed as a welcome tool 
of accountability for Parliament, which does not undermine judicial independence. 
 Example 1.3. In May 2011, the High Court interpreted provisions of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 on police bail in an unexpected way, a judgment 
that was reported as leaving the position of 85,000 suspects in doubt. 68 In June, the 
Minister for Policing and Criminal Justice (Nick Herbert MP) made a statement 
saying ‘Th ere seems to be general agreement that this was an unusual judgment, 
which overturned 25 years of legal understanding. We cannot wait for a Supreme 
Court decision, and emergency legislation is therefore sensible and appropriate’. 
Responding to a question (‘Does my right hon. Friend agree that judgments such 
as this, which fl y in the face of common sense, run the risk of bringing our justice 
system into disrepute?’), the minister said: ‘I think that the best way that I could 
respond would be by quoting the legal expert Professor Michael Zander QC, 
whom my hon. Friend may have heard on the “Today” programme this morning. 
He said: “Th e only justifi cation for the ruling is a literal interpretation of the Act 
which makes no sense” ’. 69 Th e House of Lords Constitution Committee criticized 
the Government’s decision to introduce a bill while an appeal to the Supreme 
Court was pending; this gave rise to ‘diffi  cult issues of constitutional principle as 
regards both the separation of powers and the rule of law’ (a point that govern-
ment appeared not to accept). 70 Th e minister responsible for the bill in the Lords 
 64  Ministry of Justice,  Memorandum to the Justice Select Committee: Post-Legislative Assessment of the 
Compensation Act 2006 (Cm 8267, 2012) paras 62-3. 
 65  Th e Law Commission,  Post-legislative Scrutiny (Law Com No 302, Cm 6945, 2006). 
 66  Law Comm,  Post-legislative Scrutiny para. 2.4. 
 67  Law Comm,  Post-Legislative Scrutiny para. 3.67. 
 68  R (Manchester Police) v Hookway [2011] EWHC 1578 (Admin), [2011] 3 All ER 521. 
 69  HC Deb 30 June 2011, vol 530, cols 1133-42. 
 70  HL Constitution Committee,  Police (Detention and Bail) Bill (HL 2009-11, 143); and sub-
sequent correspondence with the minister < http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees-a-z/
lords-select/constitution-committee/correspondence-with-ministers1/parliament-2010/bill-scrutiny > 
(accessed 22 April 2013). 
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responded that the government ‘really do not believe that we are undermining the 
constitutional separation of powers by asking Parliament to legislate to reverse the 
eff ect of a High Court decision in advance of the issue having been decided by the 
Supreme Court’. 71 Th e fast-tracked bill, which had retrospective eff ect, became the 
Police (Detention and Bail) Act 2011 and the Greater Manchester Police withdrew 
their appeal. 
 Th e parliamentary response to the PACE ruling highlights the question of tim-
ing: the general rules of  sub judice discourage Parliament from scrutinizing judg-
ments or commenting on cases which are actually pending before the courts while 
retaining the ultimate right to legislate on any matter. 72 Comity and practical coor-
dination between the judicial, legislative and executive limbs of the state require a 
principled approach to be taken in relation to cases that are awaiting decision on 
appeal to the Supreme Court; it is far from clear that this happened. 
 Example 1.4. Th e House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 
carrying out an inquiry into press freedom and privacy, reported under the head-
ing ‘Mr Justice Eady and Privacy Law’ that they had ‘received no evidence in this 
inquiry that the judgments of Mr Justice Eady in the area of privacy have departed 
from following the principles set out by the House of Lords and the European 
Court of Human Rights’, adding that ‘If he, or indeed any other High Court 
judge, departed from these principles, we would expect the matter to be success-
fully appealed to a higher court’. 73 In reaching that conclusion, the committee 
heard from journalists, judges and lawyers. Th e review into the jurisprudence and 
ideology of Mr Justice Eady is probably best seen as turning on the specifi c circum-
stances of a particular Select Committee inquiry: the committee was faced with 
allegations made by an editor of a national newspaper and they felt could not, in 
the context, be ignored. Th e committee’s report was carefully worded and favour-
able in outcome to the judge. Th ere is, however, a signifi cant threat that  individual 
judicial independence is compromised if a Select Committee embarks on a line of 
inquiry into a body of case law by a named judge. 
 2.  Foundations 
 In the absence of a written constitution, the constitutional framework of the 
judicial system has to rest on ordinary legislation (primary and secondary), ‘soft 
law’ and constitutional conventions. Under the new architecture, the principal 
statutes are the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and the Tribunals, Courts and 
Enforcement Act 2007. (Provisions intended by the government to be included 
in the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 were dropped to enable 
the bill to receive royal assent before the 2010 general election). Examples of 
‘soft law’ include:  the 2004 concordat between the Lord Chancellor and the 
 71  HL Deb 12 July 2011, vol 000, col 603 (Baroness Browning).    72  Erskine May  441-2. 
 73  House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee,  Press Standards, Privacy and Libel 
(2009-10, 326-I) para. 76. Paul Dacre, editor of the  Daily Mail , was a consistent and vitriolic critic of 
Eady J, labelling his judgments ‘arrogant’ and ‘amoral’. 
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LCJ; 74 the ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the Offi  ce for Judicial 
Complaints, the Ministry of Justice and the Directorate of Judicial Offi  ces for 
England and Wales’; 75 Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service Framework 
Document; 76 and the list of ‘qualities and attributes’ required for judicial 
offi  ce—in other words, how ‘merit’ is defi ned—published by the JAC. 77 
 Th e following two examples provide contrasting approaches to policy formation 
and legislative scrutiny : 
 Example 2.1. In 2003, the government made a surprise announcement of plans to 
abolish the offi  ce of Lord Chancellor, create a Supreme Court in place of the Law 
Lords, and establish a new system for judicial appointments in England and Wales. 
Th ere had been no consultation with the senior judiciary. Th e proposals were subject 
to protracted parliamentary debate and scrutiny before the bill was published: in 
an unusual move, the Conservative Opposition in the House of Lords successfully 
moved an amendment to the Loyal Address after the Queen’s Speech (calling on 
the government ‘to withdraw their current proposals and to undertake meaning-
ful consultation with Parliament and the senior judiciary before proceeding with 
legislation’); a major inquiry and report by the House of Commons Constitutional 
Aff airs Committee; and a ‘take note’ debate in the Lords. 78 Th e House of Commons 
Constitutional Aff airs Committee criticized the Government for not publishing a 
draft bill. 79 At second reading of the Constitutional Reform Bill in March 2004, 
the Lords voted to refer the bill to a special committee with powers to take evidence 
and amend the bill before recommitting it to a Committee of the Whole House 
(a procedure that had lain dormant for several decades). Several members of the 
judiciary took part in Lords debates and one voted in a division (Lord Hoff mann, 
against the government). ‘Carried over’ to the 2004-5 session, the bill was modifi ed 
in signifi cant ways in both Houses before receiving Royal Assent fi ve days before 
Parliament was prorogued for the 2005 general election. 
 Example  2.2. In 2000, the government appointed an independent panel, 
chaired by retired judge Sir Andrew Leggatt, with broad terms of reference to 
undertake a review of ‘the delivery of justice through tribunals other than ordinary 
courts of law’ leading to a report in 2001. 80 Th e Department for Constitutional 
 74  Constitutional Reform: Th e Lord Chancellor’s judiciary-related functions: Proposals (2004). < http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dca.gov.uk/consult/lcoffice/judiciary.htm > 
accessed 9 March 2012. 
 75  < http://judicialcomplaints.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Memorandum_of_Understanding.pdf > 
(accessed 22 April 2013). 
 76  HM Courts & Tribunals Service,  Framework Document (Cm 8043, 2011). 
 77  JAC, ‘Qualities and abilities’ < http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/application-process/112.htm > accessed 
7 March 2012. 
 78  See  Andrew  Le Sueur ,  ‘From Appellate Committee to Supreme Court: A Narrative’ in  Louis 
 Blom-Cooper ,  Brice  Dickson and  Gavin  Drewry (eds),  Th e Judicial House of Lords 1876-2009 
( Oxford :  Oxford University Press,  2009 ), ch 5 . 
 79  HC Constitutional Aff airs Committee,  Judicial appointments and a Supreme Court (court of fi nal 
appeal) (HC 2003-4, 48) para. 118 (‘Th e Constitutional Reform Bill is a clear candidate for examina-
tion in draft’). 
 80  Andrew Leggatt,  Tribunals for Users One System, One Service (2001) < http://webarchive. 
nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.tribunals-review.org.uk/leggatthtm/leg-00.htm > (accessed 22 
April 2013). 
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Aff airs responded in 2004 with an equally wide-ranging White Paper, accept-
ing the thrust of the Leggatt recommendations and proposing a new principle 
of ‘proportionate dispute resolution’ to avoid disputes arising and to encourage 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR). 81 In 2006, the Government published a 
draft Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill. 82 Neither the House of Commons 
Justice Committee nor the House of Lords Constitution Committee felt able to 
fi nd time to carry out pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft bill. As well as completely 
re-designing the tribunal system (or ‘maze’ as critics dubbed it), the bill would 
amend the eligibility criteria for all judicial appointments. Th e House of Lords 
Constitution Committee successfully called for a provision on ADR included in 
the draft bill but removed from the bill ‘proper’ to be reinstated. 83 
 Th e legislation in these two examples was of great practical and constitutional 
importance. In the fi rst, ‘back of the envelope’ policy-making and a government 
decision not to publish a draft bill was countered by careful (albeit often partisan) 
parliamentary scrutiny that left few clauses unturned. In the second, careful policy 
making with judicial involvement, a White Paper and a draft bill were met with 
relative indiff erence by parliamentary Select Committees. 
 Example 2.3. In January 2004, the Lord Chancellor (Lord Falconer) and the LCJ 
(Lord Woolf ) announced that agreement had been reached on the principles and 
practices governing the transfer of functions from the former to the latter under the 
government’s proposals. Th is came to be known as ‘the concordat’. In their 2007 
report, the House of Lords Constitution Committee stated that, although  many 
aspects of the concordat had been put on a statutory footing by the CRA 2005 , 
‘it is clear to us that the concordat continues to be of great constitutional impor-
tance’. 84 In a debate on the Constitution Committee’s report, Baroness Royall 
of Blaisdon (President of the Council, speaking for the government) said ‘Th e 
Government will consult and work with the judiciary to ensure that the concordat 
remains live and relevant, and that changes to both the framework document and 
the concordat are properly put before this House’. 85 In February 2011, Lord Judge 
told the House of Lords Constitution Committee that in the event of the LCJ fail-
ing to negotiate a satisfactory annual settlement for funding the judicial system:
 I think we would have to renegotiate a new concordat, and I would expect that this 
Committee would be following very closely how we were reaching the concordat that we 
were trying to reach. I do not regard the concordat agreement between the Lord Chief 
Justice and the Lord Chancellor of the day as private between them. It is a public docu-
ment, and anybody can look at it at any time. If the situation were to reach such a parlous 
state that it broke down completely, I suspect the Lord Chief Justice of the day—because 
this will not happen in my time—would be very anxious to exercise such power as is left 
 81  Department for Constitutional Aff airs,  Transforming Public Services:  Complaints, Redress and 
Tribunals (White Paper, Cm 6243, 2004). 
 82  Th e draft Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill (Cm 6885, 2006). 
 83  HL Constitution Committee,  Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill (2006-7, 13). 
 84  HL Constitution Committee,  Relations (2006-7, 151) para. 13. 
 85  HL Deb 18 November 2008, vol 704, col 1124. 
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to him in the context of the parliamentary process:  (a)  this Committee, (b)  the Justice 
Committee and (c) the exercise under Section 5 of the Constitutional Reform Act of, in 
eff ect, writing to Parliament and setting out his or her concerns. 86 
 Example 2.4. In January 2007, the Home Secretary (John Reid MP) wrote an 
article in the  Sunday Telegraph hinting strongly that the government was minded to 
create a Ministry of Justice (merging some policy areas of the Home Offi  ce and the 
Department for Constitutional Aff airs). 87 Th e senior judiciary had not been con-
sulted at that point. Th e Prime Minister announced the creation of the Ministry 
of Justice by a written statement to Parliament on the day it rose for the Easter 
recess. 88 Th e House of Commons Constitutional Aff airs Committee carried out 
an inquiry into the decision, taking evidence from Lord Phillips CJ, Lord Justice 
Th omas, then twice from the Lord Chancellor (Lord Falconer) and permanent 
secretary (Alex Allan). Th e committee’s July 2007 report criticised the government 
for having failed to learn lessons from the way changes to the Lord Chancellor’s 
offi  ce had been announced in 2003 and for causing ‘a highly undesirable public 
confl ict between the senior judiciary’ and the government. 89 Th e House of Lords 
Constitution Committee, which was midway through an inquiry on relations 
between government, judges and Parliament, also considered the handling of the 
creation of the new ministry. 90 
 Th ese two examples demonstrate the importance of non-statutory foundations 
for the judicial system. In relation to the concordat, there are several statements 
about its perceived importance , but parliamentarians have not been specifi c about 
what exactly their continuing role might appropriately be in scrutiny of the future 
developments of the concordat. Th is uncertainty is a refl ection of doubts about the 
constitutional status of the concordat. On one view, its importance has faded since 
most of its provisions have been put on a statutory footing by the CRA 2005 and 
the conventions and institutional arrangements that have subsequently developed. 
Example 2.4 shows the mediating role Parliament is able to play when fundamen-
tal disagreements arise between government and the judiciary. A carefully planned 
campaign by senior judges allowed them to use Select Committee hearings to vent 
their concerns about the manner in which the government had acted in setting up 
the MoJ as well as the substance of the government’s plans. 
 3.  Judicial appointments 
 Th e 2005 constitutional settlement gave responsibility for selecting candidates for 
judicial offi  ce to an arm’s length body, the Judicial Appointments Commission 
 86  HL Constitution Committee,  Meetings with the Lord Chief Justice and Lord Chancellor (2010-11, 
89) Q11. 
 87  Patrick Hennessy, ‘Reid wants to split the Home Offi  ce in two’,  Sunday Telegraph, (London, 21 
January 2007) 1. 
 88  HC Deb 39 March 2007, vol 458, col 133WS. 
 89  HC Constitutional Aff airs Committee,  Th e Creation of the Ministry of Justice (2006-7, 466). 
 90  HL Constitution Committee,  Relations (2006-7, 151) para. 3. 
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(JAC) while reserving powers to the Lord Chancellor to have the fi nal say on 
accepting, rejecting or asking the JAC to reconsider a recommendation. 91 
Parliament has no role in individual appointments; its function (unstated on the 
face of the CRA) is to exercise overarching accountability functions in relation 
to the process as a whole. As the following examples show, a range of methods is 
used to achieve this. 
 Example 3.1. Lord Marks of Henley-on-Th ames (a QC) asked an oral question ‘To 
ask Her Majesty’s Government what progress is being made in improving gender 
and ethnic diversity in judicial appointments’. After the minister’s reply, fi ve other 
peers asked supplementary questions. 92 
 Example 3.2. During 2011-12, the House of Lords Constitution Committee car-
ried out a major inquiry into the judicial appointments processes in England and 
Wales and for the Supreme Court. 93 
 Example 3.3. In the calendar years 2010 and 2011, 37 written questions in the 
Commons dealt with aspects of the appointments process and judicial careers. 
 Example 3.4. Th e House of Commons Justice Committee has held evidence ses-
sions on the work of the JAC: two sessions in 2007; 94 and in 2010, hearing from 
Baroness Prashar (the chair), Jonathan Sumption QC (as he then was), and Edward 
Nally (legal practitioner members). 95 
 Th e picture that emerges is of some parliamentarians in both Houses keen to 
have oversight of the judicial appointments system as a whole, and to exercise 
scrutiny on a regular and rigorous basis. So far, however, parliamentarians have 
consistently rejected suggestions that they should have any role in individual senior 
appointments, as House of Commons Select Committees now have in relation to 
several public offi  ces for which they carry out pre-appointment hearings with the 
preferred candidate. 96 One of the main reasons for eschewing this direct form of 
accountability is that parliamentary involvement would risk undermining judicial 
independence, in fact or perception, if appointment hearings were to be conducted 
along partisan lines. Th is is a concern that needs to be taken seriously, though in 
an era when the LCJ subjects himself to an annual press conference and judges are 
content to give public lectures openly critical of government , the concern may be 
overstated. 97 
 91  CRA 2005, Pt 4.    92  HL Deb 17 March 2011, vol 725, col 347. 
 93  HL Constitution Committee,  Judicial Appointments , 25th Report of 2010-12 (HL Paper 272). 
 94  < http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmconst/cmconst.
htm >(accessed 22 April 2013). 
 95  HC Justice Committee,  Minutes of Evidence: Th e work of the Judicial Appointments Commission (HC 
2009-10) < http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmjust/449-i/10090701.
htm > (accessed 22 April 2013). 
 96  See eg. Select Committee on the Constitutional Reform Bill,  Report (2003-4,125-I), paras 
412-14; HL Constitution Committee,  Relations (2006-7, 151) para. 131. 
 97  See eg. Lord Phillips, ‘Judicial independence and accountability: a view from the Supreme Court’ 
(UCL Constitution Unit launch of research project on the politics of judicial independence, London, 
8 February 2011). 
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 4.  Judicial discipline 
 Th e British constitution allocates to Parliament alone the power to dismiss judges 
of the High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court: judges hold offi  ce ‘dur-
ing good behaviour, subject to a power of removal by Her Majesty on an address 
presented to Her by both Houses of Parliament’. 98 No judge has been subject to 
this procedure in modern times, but it is important to recognise that Parliament 
has this ultimate ‘sacrifi cial’ tool of accountability. Dismissal of judges below the 
level of the High Court on grounds of misbehaviour is by the Lord Chancellor 
with the concordance of the LCJ.  Erskine May is clear that ‘Unless the discussion 
is based upon a substantive motion, refl ections must not be cast upon the con-
duct of . . . judges of the superior courts of the United Kingdom, including persons 
holding the position of a judge, such as circuit judges and their deputies, as well as 
recorders’. 99 Th e parliamentary record reveals MPs do, from time to time, want to 
criticize the conduct of individual judges. 
 Example 4.1. An Early Day Motion by Mildred Gordon MP called for the dis-
missal of Judge Sir Harold Cassel QC over sentencing remarks in a child abuse 
case. 100 It seems that the judge had, in fact, already tendered his resignation. 
 Example 4.2. Mark Todd MP led a debate on ‘Judicial Error (Compensation)’ in 
Westminster Hall. He dealt in detail with the case of a constituent who had been 
convicted of indecent assault, which was subsequently held to be unsafe by the 
Court of Appeal. Th e MP was critical of the trial judge (whom he did not name) 
and went on to say :
 Th e straight answer is that I do not know what happened to the judge after his decision was 
corrected. Although I can appreciate that the objectivity and independence of the judiciary 
might be harmed by, say, the ability of a complainant to sue the judge for damages where 
their error causes harm, I would expect some accountability to be exercised for judicial 
error. On my observation, we instead enter into a polite and largely private world. Some of 
the texts that I have read, which were written by learned lawyers, point out that it can be 
argued that the appellate process off ers some accountability, in that it demonstrates where 
a correction is required of a judge. 101 
 For the government, Harriett Harman MP accepted that this individual case ‘raises 
a number of important and diffi  cult points of principle’ and went on to explain the 
compensation schemes available for wrongful convictions (which did not apply) 
and the new Offi  ce of Judicial Conduct. 
 Example 4.3. An MP used the daily adjournment debate to raise the ‘some-
what esoteric subject of ex parte applications in the family courts’ and a specifi c 
case involving constituents. He said that ‘I understand that in 2006-7 . . . two 
 98  Senior Courts Act 1981, s 11; Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s 33.    99  Eskine May , 443-4. 
 100  EDM 83, 1988-9 (29 November 1988); Anon, ‘His Honour Sir Harold Cassel, Bt (obitu-
ary)’,  Daily Telegraph, (London, 21 September 2001)  < http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituar-
ies/1341145/His-Honour-Sir-Harold-Cassel-Bt.html > (accessed 22 April 2013). 
 101  HC Deb 8 March 2006, vol 443, col 312WH. 
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complaints were upheld out of the 938 complaints made against judges. Th at tells 
us how much accountability m’learned friends in that high offi  ce have. It seems 
that judges have power without responsibility to anybody but themselves and one 
another’. 102 
 Example 4.4. Th e annual report of the Offi  ce for Judicial Complaints is published 
by the Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence of the LCJ. Th is event is put on the 
parliamentary record by a written statement. 103 It appears that there has never been 
Select Committee scrutiny of the report or any debate of it in Parliament. 
 It is diffi  cult to see how individualized censure can ever be appropriate in the 
light of (a) the principle of independence of the judiciary and (b) the existence of 
the Offi  ce for Judicial Complaints, established as part of the new CRA arrange-
ments. Parliament’s attention would be better directed at ensuring  eff ective system-
atic scrutiny of the general work of the OJC, but this it has failed to do despite the 
availability of a detailed annual report. 
 5.  Judicial governance 
 Th e fi nal aspects of the judicial system that will be examined are the new institu-
tions of self-governance, with the LCJ at its apex. As noted above, there has been 
a transfer of management and leadership power to the judiciary under the CRA 
2005. 104 Th e making of annual reports is an accountability tool in its own right but 
is also capable of being the basis of further parliamentary scrutiny. 
 Example 5.1. Th e LCJ has no statutory duty to make an annual report. In May 
2006, Lord Phillips CJ told the House of Lords Constitution Committee that 
this ‘is something we are considering’. In July 2007, he announced that the 
Judicial Executive Board would publish an annual report. 105 Th e House of Lords 
Constitution Committee welcomed this, as ‘the report will provide a useful oppor-
tunity for both Houses of Parliament to debate these matters on an annual basis, 
and for the Lord Chief Justice to engage eff ectively with parliamentarians and the 
public’. 106 Th e Lord Chancellor told Parliament that ‘Th e Lord Chief Justice views 
this as a way to demonstrate the judiciary’s accountability to the public and parlia-
mentarians without compromising judicial independence’. 107 Th ere then followed 
uncertainty about the procedural mechanism whereby such a report could be made 
to Parliament. CRA 2005 , s 5 provides that the LCJ ‘may lay before Parliament 
written representations on matters that appear to him to be matters of importance 
relating to the judiciary, or otherwise to the administration of justice’. Initially, this 
had been seen as a ‘nuclear option’, to be used only in circumstances approaching 
 102  HC Deb 20 January 2010, vol 504, col 408 (Peter Kilfoyle MP). 
 103  See eg. HC Deb 25 February 2010, vol 506, col 78-9WS.    104  See section A2b above. 
 105  HL Constitution Committee,  Relations (2006-7, 151) para. 136. 
 106  HL Constitution Committee,  Relations (2006-7, 151) para. 139. 
 107  HC Justice Committee, ‘Jack Straw MP: Memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Justice’, 
 Minutes of Evidence (2007-8) < http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/
cmjust/913/8070201.htm > (accessed 22 April 2013). 
09_Ch09_9780199670024C09.indd   221 10/25/2013   3:29:42 PM
Parliamentary Accountability and the Judicial System222
a constitutional crisis. 108 Th e fi rst report was published in March 2008, covering 
the period April 2006 to September 2007. It was neither published in Hansard nor 
debated. In 2008, Lord Phillips  appeared to have ‘resiled from the commitment 
to publish such a report on a strictly annual basis’, though that seemed to be to 
avoid binding his successor, Lord Judge (who was to assume the offi  ce  of LCJ in 
October 2008). 109 Lord Judge told the Constitution Committee that he felt ‘it may 
not be sensible to produce [a report] every year’. 110 Two further reports have been 
published: one in February 2010 for the legal year 2008-9; and the other in August 
2012 for the period January 2010 to June 2012. 111 Th ese have not been debated 
in Parliament. Th e judiciary website states :  ‘Future reviews will be produced to 
provide information about the preceding Legal Year’. 112 
 Example 5.2. In February 2010, the Senior President of Tribunals presented his 
fi rst annual report. Th e foreword  explained that it was ‘not intended as a formal 
report under section 43 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007’ under 
which the Senior President ‘is required to report annually to the Lord Chancellor, 
specifi cally about “cases ” rather than the function of the new system of tribunals in 
general’. 113 Th e report is succinct but informative. It deals with organisational mat-
ters and with tribunal law and jurisprudence. It includes contributions from diff er-
ent tribunal judges. A second annual report appeared in February 2011. Th ere was 
no discussion of either report on the parliamentary record. 
 Th ese two examples reveal uncertainty about the scope and purpose of the 
reporting duties contained in legislation.Th e examples also show varying degrees of 
eagerness by Select Committees to follow-up annual reports with evidence sessions. 
 D.  Conclusions 
 It has been argued that the orthodox approach to parliamentary accountability 
practices in relation to the judicial system—a prohibited zone plus ministerial 
responsibility—is no longer viable given the dramatic changes that have taken 
place in the judicial power of the state, the governance of the judiciary, and ris-
ing expectations about the degrees to which all public bodies are held to account. 
Additional tools of accountability are needed. Th is study has sought to examine the 
ways in which MPs and peers have and use opportunities to exercise an account-
ability role: all the accountability procedures at their disposal are used to some 
 108  Joshua Rozenberg, ‘Lord Phillips prepares to gain more power’,  Daily Telegraph, (London, 19 
July 2007); HL Constitution Committee,  Relations (2006-7, 151) para. 113. 
 109  HL Constitution Committee,  Relations:  Follow-up Report (HL 2007-8, 177)  para. 22; Lord 
Goodlad, HL Deb 18 November 2008, vol 705, col 1105. 
 110  HL Constitution Committee,  Relations: Follow-up Report . 
 111  Judiciary of England and Wales,  Th e Lord Chief Justice’s Review of Administration of Justice in the 
Courts ( London ,  2010 ) and  Th e Lord Chief Justice’s Report 2010-12 (London, 2012). 
 112  < http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/media-releases/2010/0510 > (accessed 22 April 2013). 
 113  Senior President of Tribunals,  Annual Report: Tribunals Transformed (Ministry of Justice, 2010) 12. 
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extent. Select committees appear to be regarded as especially important, both for 
parliamentarians and the judiciary. 
 Although constitutional principle and standing orders discourage parliamen-
tary scrutiny of the core activities of the judicial system (deciding individual cases 
and setting precedents), parliamentarians can and do inquire into case law and 
approaches to statutory interpretation, though there are unresolved questions about 
the constitutional propriety of doing so, for example in carrying out post-legislative 
scrutiny. Parliament’s record in examining legislative change is mixed:  the CRA 
2005 shows Parliament responding in a thorough if rather partisan way to poorly 
prepared government policy; the failure of any Select Committee to undertake 
pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill dem-
onstrates the diffi  culties parliamentarians have in fi nding time and enthusiasm 
for eff ective legislative scrutiny. Th ere seems no appetite among MPs or peers for 
involvement in individual judicial appointments. From time to time, MPs seek to 
criticize individual judges for their conduct but there has been little or no interest 
in scrutinizing the work of the complaints system that now exists. In relation to 
judicial leadership and governance, there is a lack of clarity about when and why 
statutory duties to make annual reports should exist and variations in practice in 
making and scrutinizing reports. 
 Eff ective parliamentary accountability mechanisms, respecting the independ-
ence of the judiciary, are important for the legitimacy of the judicial system. Th ey 
may also help to dissuade ministers and their speechwriters from taking cheap 
shots at judges and judgments. 114 
 114  See n 2 above. 
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